Listen Music during reading my blog

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

New market, called "Pandora- Smooth As Silk" http://pandorajodqp5zrr.onion/






At first, official market and forum address:
http://pandorajodqp5zrr.onion/

Market:
http://pandorajodqp5zrr.onion
(it`s good practice, to have in your mind address start with pandora and ends with zrr.onion)
Forum:
http://bl3j73taluhwidx5.onion

Who is Alice ?
Alice is person behind Pandora open market and it is identified only by public key presented on this page, any other identities you can consider as possible scam. Alice is very paranoid about both internet and personal security and don`t except she to be chatty. Alice only want to run this market and comment only major issues.

Why i developed Pandora openmarket ?
First i must say, i started programming it like 2 days after SilkRoad closure, because i did not knew about other markets available. After i found out, there are 2 good already established market, that are working well, so there is probably no-need to have third market, but it is already done, and nobody knows, what can happen with those 2 markets (ddos, hacked, seized, closed etc.), so pandora will be there as servers (dedicated, encrypted and very powerful) and equipment are fully paid up for long time in advance.

Why your design is really bad ?
Alice is not into graphic design, if there will be somebody to style pandora market, that person will be welcomed to re-style whole market. Alice aim is to provide code and server-side security and provide simple and effective service for vendors and buyers.

So now Alice decided to go this way with PANDORA:
1) Only verified vendors from another markets will be allowed to register on Pandora marketplace (for free).
2) All vendors must go thru verification, when we verify identity of vendor thru another market (we will contact you and verify on another market to prove it is you and not scam vendor who pretend to be established vendor).
3) New or unknown vendors will have to pay high fee/bond ($500 USD) to prevent scam or not serious vendors of registering.

Saturday, October 26, 2013

Wednesday, October 23, 2013

Black Market Reloaded DDOS attacked - Alternative adress: http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/




Seems like we're experiencing a DDOS so here we have our alternative address.
Alternative address: http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/

You can join BMR again, just use the alternative adress !

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

A behind-the-scenes look at the federal agents' digital detective work


Free Ross Ulbricht



 His support team just got 15btc that's a shame (https://www.rossulbricht.org/)

Ross Ulbricht has retained New York attorney Joshua Dratel to defend him from criminal charges in the Silk Road/Dread Pirate(s) Roberts case.

More info here:   https://www.rossulbricht.org/
 


Criminals who prowl the cyber-underworld's "darknet" thought law enforcement couldn't crack their anonymous trade in illegal drugs, guns and porn. But a series of arrests this month, including the bust of the black market site Silk Road, shows the G-men have infiltrated the Internet's back alley.
Computer experts suspect the government simply beat the cyber-pirates at their own game: hacking.
The Silk Road website, which has a customer-friendly electronic storefront that displayed bricks of cocaine as deftly as Amazon displays books, was the cyber-underworld's largest black market, with $1.2 billion in sales and nearly a million customers. Beyond illegal drugs, the site served as a bazaar for fake passports, driver's licenses and other documents, as well as illegal service providers, such as hit men, forgers and computer hackers.
FBI Agent Christopher Tarbell of the FBI's cyber-crime unit in New York called Silk Road "the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace on the Internet today."
Silk Road used an underground computer network known as "The Onion Router" or "Tor" that relays computer messages through at least three separate computer servers to disguise its users. Customers conducted business using a virtual currency called bitcoin. The site repeatedly assured its users that their illegal transactions were wrapped in layers of privacy.
But the FBI's seizure of Silk Road's servers allowed agents to unwrap the website's innards, exposing the vendors' and customers' private accounts to law enforcement scrutiny.
Q & A: A bit about bitcoin
Court papers show that federal agents used the full bag of traditional investigatory tricks as well as high-tech cyber-sleuthing to dismantle Silk Road. The site's alleged operator made critical missteps that allowed agents to locate the website and link him to it, court papers show.
FBI, DEA, IRS and Customs agents located six of Silk Road's supposedly off-the-grid computer servers hidden around the world, in places including Latvia and Romania, copied their contents and watched as buyers and sellers completed their illegal transactions. It shut down the website, seized its assets, including 26,000 bitcoins worth about $4 million, and arrested Ross Ulbricht, the alleged operator, in San Francisco on Oct. 1.
The FBI estimates that Silk Road's operator made $80 million in commissions from the site's users, court papers say.
Ulbricht is charged in federal court in New York with money laundering, drug dealing and conspiring to murder a witness. A second indictment filed in a federal court in Baltimore charges Ulbricht with drug dealing and attempting to have a former employee murdered.
Ulbrict will be extradited to New York to face the charges. His court-appointed attorney, assistant federal defender Brandon LeBlanc, who said his client denied the charges at a court hearing Oct. 4, did not return phone messages left at his office.
The investigation into the cyber-underworld swept up suspected drug dealers and buyers in the USA, Britain, Australia and Sweden with alleged ties to Silk Road.
"These arrests send a clear message to criminals: The hidden Internet isn't hidden, and your anonymous activity isn't anonymous. We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you," Keith Bristow, director of Britain's National Crime Agency, said after the arrest Oct. 8 of four men for alleged drug offenses.
The criminals, he said, "always make mistakes."
The FBI hasn't said how it found Silk Road's servers or compromised them. Members of the FBI's cyber-crimes unit were not available, FBI spokesman Peter Donald said.
"That is the $64,000 question. They have not explained how they did it," says Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute in Berkeley, Calif., who specializes in network security and underground economics.
Weaver suspects from reading the court papers that federal agents found weaknesses in the computer code used to operate the Silk Road website and exploited those weaknesses to hack the servers and force them to reveal their unique identifying addresses. Federal investigators could then locate the servers and ask law enforcement in those locations to seize them.
DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS
Authorities say Ulbricht started Silk Road on Jan. 27, 2011.
By then, Ulbricht, 29, who grew up in Austin, had graduated from the University of Texas-Dallas, where he earned a degree in physics in 2006, school records show. He attended graduate school at Penn State, where he earned the prestigious Anne C. Wilson Graduate Research Award for materials science for the 2008-09 academic year, school records show. On his LinkedIn page, he identified himself as an entrepreneur and investor.
Statements Ulbricht made in college and posts he made online show he leaned libertarian. On Facebook in 2010, he posted a page-long essay inspired by Independence Day. "Always, freedom arises in the absence of limitation," he wrote. He embraced Austrian economic theory, whose advocates favor strong protection of private property rights, but minimal economic regulation.
On Silk Road, federal investigators say, Ulbricht called himself "Dread Pirate Roberts," shortened often to "DPR." The moniker comes from a character in the novel The Princess Bride, depicted as a ruthless pirate who takes no prisoners. Eventually, "Captain Roberts" is revealed as a series of people who pass on the "dread pirate" alias, and his fearsome reputation, to a successor on retirement.
In one post to the site, after users complained about a hike in Silk Road commissions, investigators say, Ulbricht wrote, "Whether you like it or not, I am the captain of this ship. You are here voluntarily, and if you don't like the rules of the game, or you don't trust your captain, you can get off the boat."
In San Francisco, where court papers say he moved in September 2012, Ulbricht lived quietly and cheaply, first bunking with friends, then renting a room for $1,000 a month. He paid in cash. His roommates knew him as "Josh" and told authorities he spent a lot of time on his computer.
Court papers say Ulbricht procured computer hosts for the Silk Road website, wrote most of the computer code and maintained the security on the site by himself.
HOW TOR ENABLED SILK ROAD
Central to the operation of Silk Road was a complex underground computer routing system known as Tor. Ulbricht allegedly used the system to hide the location of the computer servers that hosted the Silk Road website.
But Tor is no secret, especially to the U.S. government.
The U.S. Naval Research Lab developed onion routing, the concept behind Tor, as a way to protect naval communication so an enemy could not trace computer messages and detect a ship's position. Every computer on the Internet has an Internet Protocol, or IP, address that can be used to find its physical location. Tor ensures privacy by randomly routing computer messages through several places on the Internet, wrapped in layers of encryption, so no single point can link the source to the destination.
The routing system is public and maintained by a non-profit organization that runs on donations from a variety of organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Radio Free Asia, the National Science Foundation and Google. Dissidents in countries that restrict Internet access use Tor to publish out of government reach. Journalists use Tor to communicate with confidential sources. WikiLeaks used Tor to collect documents from whistle-blowers who wanted to remain anonymous. Law enforcement agents use Tor to visit websites without leaving a record of a government computer or IP address in the Web's log.
Though some government agencies may use Tor for their own research or communication, the National Security Agency seeks to unmask anonymous Internet communication, director of National Intelligence James Clapper said in response to documents revealed by fugitive whistle-blower Edward Snowden.
"The Intelligence Community's interest in online anonymity services and other online communication and networking tools is based on the undeniable fact that these are tools our adversaries use to communicate and coordinate attacks against the United States and our allies," Clapper said Oct. 4.
Tor also hosts black markets, such as Sheep Marketplace and Black Market Reloaded, that deal in guns, drugs, stolen credit card numbers and child pornography. The United States seeks the extradition of Eric Marques, who was arrested in Ireland for allegedly hosting a website on the Tor network that allowed people to share child pornography.
Silk Road created a private network through Tor by using software to build encrypted connections through relays on the network. The system is created so no single relay, or server, knew the complete path. A computer algorithm on Tor generates a complex Web address that ends in .onion and can be accessed only by downloading Tor software.
Once logged into Silk Road, buyers and sellers could conduct business in a virtual currency called bitcoin, which, unlike a credit card or a check, leaves little traceable information. Silk Road used a bitcoin tumbler that sent the individual transactions through a complex series of dummy transaction to disguise the link between buyers and sellers.
DEA agents learned of Silk Road within months after it went online. In June 2011, Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., called on federal agents to investigate it. Court papers indicate federal agents began making hundreds of undercover purchases from the site in November 2011.
MARKETING A 'SECRET' SITE
To attract customers and vendors and direct them to the secret site, Silk Road's operator initially had to publicize it on the Web.
One FBI agent did a simple Internet search and found a post from Jan. 27, 2011, on a forum for people who use magic mushrooms called "Shroomery" (www.shroomery.org) in which a user identified as "altoid" mentioned Silk Road under the guise of seeking information. The post explained that it's a Tor-hidden service and the address could be found at silkroad420.wordpress.com. "Altoid" posted about Silk Road two days later, this time at "Bitcointalk.org," an online discussion forum.
"Altoid" posted again Oct. 11, 2011, in "Bitcoin Forum," seeking "the best and brightest IT pro in the bitcoin community" to help develop a bitcoin start-up company. This time, the FBI caught a break: "Altoid" instructed potential candidates to reply to his Gmail address, rossulbricht@gmail.com.
The FBI subpoenaed subscriber records from Google for the Gmail address, which was registered to Ulbricht and included a photo that matched a photo of Ulbricht on LinkedIn. His Google profile included YouTube videos from the Mises Institute, an Austrian economic think-tank.
In his postings on Silk Road's forum, the site operator "Dread Pirate Roberts' " signature included a link to the Mises Institute website. "Dread Pirate Roberts" often cited Austrian economic theory and the works of Ludwig von Mises as the philosophical underpinning of Silk Road.
The Google records showed every IP address used to access Ulbricht's Gmail account this year from Jan. 13 to June 20, court papers said. The IP address associated with the Gmail account led to a computer in an apartment on Hickory Street in San Francisco, where Ulbricht had moved in September 2012. The logs indicated Ulbricht accessed his Gmail account from a cafe on Laguna Street, less than 500 feet from the apartment, court papers say.
Ultimately, the FBI linked the computer at the Hickory Street apartment and its IP address to code on the Silk Road server that allowed the computer access, court papers say.
The FBI got insight into Ulbricht's computer code from an undisguised post on a computer programming website. On March 5, 2012, Ulbricht opened an account under his own name on stackoverflow.com, posted 12 lines of computer code and sought advice for fixing a coding problem. Realizing his error, he quickly deleted his real name and changed his user name to "frosty" and his e-mail to frosty@frosty.com.
Forensic analysts found a revised version of the same code on the Silk Road website, court papers say. The analysis also found encryption keys that end with "frosty@frosty."
THE STING
The FBI used one of its tried and true techniques: the sting.
An FBI agent went undercover in 2012 posing as a drug dealer who wanted to do business on Silk Road. The agent e-mailed "Dread Pirate Roberts," directly seeking help finding a buyer for a kilogram of cocaine. Ulbricht allegedly instructed one of his employees to help. The alleged buyer, who turned out to be the employee, deposited $27,000 in bitcoins in a Silk Road account and arranged a shipment to his home. Federal agents arrested the employee, who is not named in court papers.
On Jan. 26, the FBI says in court papers, Ulbricht e-mailed the undercover agent to say the employee had been arrested and had stolen funds from other Silk Road users. He allegedly asked the agent to have the employee beaten up and forced to return the money.
The next day, Ulbricht allegedly asked the FBI agent to have the employee killed because "now that he's been arrested, I'm afraid he'll give up info." The FBI says Ulbricht agreed to pay $80,000 for the hit and on Feb. 4 wired $40,000 from Technocash Limited in Australia to a bank account at Capital One in Washington. Ulbricht deposited another $40,000 after the undercover agent e-mailed him staged photographs of the killing, court papers say.
That case, filed in May and unsealed with Ulbricht's arrest Oct. 1, charges Ulbricht with a drug dealing conspiracy and attempted murder of a witness.
By July 23, investigators had located at least one of Silk Road's servers in a foreign country, which the FBI has not identified. IP addresses listed in court papers are linked to servers in Iceland, Latvia and Romania, according to Internet registries. Once the FBI found the server, it executed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request that allowed law enforcement in that country to make a copy of the Silk Road server and give it to the FBI. The snapshot gave the FBI records of 1.2 million transactions from Feb. 6, 2011, to July 23 and all of the site operator's e-mail exchanges.
How the FBI located a Silk Road server remains a mystery. Computer experts don't know for sure how federal investigators defeated a system that most people, including Ulbricht, thought impenetrable. Jerry Brito, a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University with expertise in technology regulation, says many experts have speculated that the FBI has identified a flaw, or back door, in the Tor system that computer experts have missed.
More likely, Brito says, the FBI compromised Silk Road by bypassing the website's security through weaknesses in Ulbricht's computer code, hacking into the site and issuing computer commands that allowed it to act like the site's administrator and talk to the server. The FBI's computer experts knew from the posts on the computer programmer forum that Ulbricht had coding challenges.
"We know he was not the most proficient coder in the world," Brito said. "It's very easy, if you are a novice programmer, to do things that you're not aware of that can compromise security."
SILK ROAD UNRAVELS
Federal investigators also had a stroke of luck. On July 10, as part of a routine search at the Canadian border, customs agents intercepted a package of nine fake IDs. Each of the IDs had different names, but the same picture of Ulbricht. E-mail exchanges found on the Silk Road server indicate "Dread Pirate Roberts" had sought IDs in June from several Silk Road vendors so he could rent servers under an assumed name to buttress Silk Road's reliability.
On July 26, three days after federal investigators located one of Silk Road's servers, investigators from Homeland Security paid Ulbricht a visit at his San Francisco apartment.
Court papers say Ulbricht refused to answer any questions when investigators confronted him with the fake IDs, except to point out that "'hypothetically' anyone could go onto a website named 'SilkRoad' on Tor and purchase any drugs or fake identity documents the person wanted."
On Oct. 1, federal agents waited until Ulbricht logged into his computer before sweeping in to the Glen Park branch of the San Francisco Public Library to arrest him, making it easier for agents to simply plug in a thumb drive and download everything on the computer without having to break his passwords.
The agents found the alleged Dread Pirate Roberts in the science fiction section.

Saturday, October 19, 2013

'BlackMarket Reloaded' Online Drug Bazaar Reopens After Code Leak. Now BMR is back in the game.

Black Market Reloaded is back in the game.
Yesterday it looks that BMR had the same destiniy like Silk Road.
But today BMR is back online again.
Ready to make business ....


Start TOR and go to the following adress...
Black Market Reloaded adress (requires TOR Browser):


137165972

BlackMarket Reloaded is back up, after its owner, who goes by "backopy," apparently decided the security breach is not as bad as once thought. He posted the following message to the site's forums early this morning:
After reviewing my code over and over I came to realize that I can still put it back up.
I know I'll be facing now direct hits to secondary files, but they're all well protected and even if the attacker gets the source won't be able to do much other than look at it.
Unfortunately as I don't know if the old certificate was compromised, I've to change BMR's URL.

Wait for more news in a short while.


Shortly after, backopy reopened the site. Users will not be able to add or withdraw Bitcoin for the first day, and backopy encouraged users to encrypt their communications and "clean up" their profiles.


Just weeks after the FBI took down Silk Road, the Internet's largest "sprawling black market bazaar," one of its main competitors has also gone down. Though it appears the feds aren't behind it.
BlackMarket Reloaded, which launched in 2011, was permanently taken down Thursday for precautionary reasons after someone stole and leaked the site's source code, according to BMR's owner, who goes by the alias "backopy."
"The [virtual private server] admin had stole the code and leaked it," backopy wrote on the BMR forum. "This means I can't operate anymore."
The person who leaked the code helped backopy build the site, according to the post. Backopy also confirmed that the person who stole the code eventually posted it on IoBM.net, a site that "provides informational services for hidden services."
Much like Silk Road, BMR is only accessible through Tor, a software that allows for anonymous browsing. Users paid for transactions with Bitcoin, a virtual currency that is difficult to trace. In addition to selling drugs, BMR also sold weapons, counterfeit documents and other contraband.
The website BlackMarketReloaded.org captured the following screenshot of BMR before it was taken down.

Black-Market-Reloaded-Home
In the same BMR forum thread where he announced the site's closure, backopy expressed disappointment over the turn of events in response to shocked BMR users.
"I hire hits on nobody, it's just sad that someone is running a VPS to peek its contents to pretend to be a hacker," backopy wrote. By referencing murder-for-hire, backopy is apparently trying to make a distinction between himself and Ross Ulbricht, the man the FBI arrested and accused of running Silk Road under the alias "Dread Pirate Roberts." Ulbricht is also accused of offering to pay for murder on two separate occasions, one of which the FBI staged.
In its two-and-a-half year run, Silk Road facilitated $1.2 billion in transactions and collected $80 million in commissions, according to court documents. For a sense of scale, Silk Road has more than 110,000 registered users on its forums, which are still active, while BMR has about 18,000.
It's not immediately clear the nature of the threat which caused backopy to close the site. In response to a user who questioned him on this matter, backopy wrote: "Because i don't know how much of it the hacker has and the code had links to the remaining infrastructure. Would be unwise to let it still up."
Backopy promised users they will be able to retrieve their Bitcoin in the coming days and said a new version of BMR could launch within a month, but he or she has not replied to our inquiry. We will update this story as we learn more.

(German report - Only german language) Deep Web: Black Market Reloaded wurde gehackt, geht offline - Ist aber mittlerweile wieder online :)

Deep Web: Black Market Reloaded wurde gehackt, geht offline - Ist aber mittlerweile wieder online :)

Größter illegaler Deep Web-Waffenmarkt macht dicht. Größter illegaler Deep Web-Waffenmarkt macht dicht.

Der größte illegale Online-Markt für Waffen im Deep Web ist offline. Wie der Betreiber der Seite mitteilt, wurde der Quellcode durch den Admin eines Virtual Private Servers gestohlen und veröffentlicht, weshalb der Betreiber sich dazu genötigt sah, die Webseite einzustellen, um Exploits vorzubeugen.

Black Market Reloaded, einer der erfolgreichsten Deep Web-Marktplätze, ist abrupt vom Netz gegangen. Gründer und Betreiber der auf Waffenhandel spezialisierten Plattform, "Backopy", teilte gestern mit, dass der Quellcode von einem Hacker entdeckt und veröffentlicht wurde. Versucht man derzeit die Seite aufzurufen, erscheint die Nachricht "Error connecting to DB!".
Black Market Reloaded (BMR) wurde im Juni 2011 gegründet, kurz nachdem Silk Road, der kürzlich vom FBI eingestellte illegale Online-Marktplatz für Drogen aller Art, dank einem Artikel auf Gawker.com weltweite Aufmerksamkeit erhielt. Zwar konnte man auf BMR auch andere Güter, wie beispielsweise Drogen erwerben, der Fokus der Seite lag aber überwiegend im illegalen Handel mit Schusswaffen. Angeblich war BMR der zweitprofitabelste Deep Web-Schwarzmarkt bis dato.

Admin des Virtual Private Servers war die Schwachstelle

Um anonym zu bleiben, verwendete Betreiber "Backopy" einen Virtual Private Server und den Anonymisierungsdienst Tor. Allerdings hatte das System eine Schwachstelle, den Administrator des VPS. Genau dieser hat nun angeblich den Quellcode der Seite kopiert und veröffentlicht. Für "Backopy" bedeutet das, dass er das Projekt nicht weiter fortführen kann, wie die englischsprachige Webseite The Daily Dot berichtet. In ein paar Tagen will "Backopy" ein System auf die Beine gestellt haben, um allen Nutzern ihre verbliebenen Bitcoins zurückzahlen zu können.
Wer auch immer im Besitz des Quellcodes ist, kann den Aufbau und die Architektur der Seite auf Schwachstellen hin untersuchen. Ob die Unbekannten auch Zugriff auf die Datenbanken und Server von BMR haben, ist derzeit nicht bekannt. "Backopy" selbst sagt, dass er nicht wisse, in welchem Umfang die Angreifer Zugang zu Informationen haben, weshalb er keine andere Wahl als die Abschaltung der Seite habe. Dass BMR kompromittiert ist, meldete zuerst ein Nutzer im deutschen Forum iobm.net und veröffentlichte dort die index.php von BMR gleich mit.
Black Market Reloaded wird allerdings nicht vollkommen zu Grabe getragen. Betreiber „Backopy“ will innerhalb der kommenden Monate mit Version 5 wieder ans Netz gehen. Angst vor einer Verhaftung durch das FBI hat "Backopy" offenbar nicht. In einem Vergleich mit dem kürzlich verhafteten R.W. Ulbricht, angeblicher Betreiber des Online-Drogen-Marktes Silk Road, schrieb "Backopy": "Ich heuere keine Meuchelmörder an; es ist nur traurig, dass jemand ein VPS unterhält um im Content rumzuschnüffeln und so zu tun, als sei er ein Hacker."



Black Market Reloaded wieder online !
Starte TOR  und gehe zu folgender adresse:
Black Market Reloaded Adresse (benötigt TOR Browser):

Friday, October 18, 2013

Black Market Reloaded back In The Game (New adress)

Looks like Black Market Reloaded is back in the game.
Yesterday it looks that BMR had the same destiniy like Silk Road.
But today BMR is back online again.
Ready to rumble ... 

Start TOR and go to the following adress...
Black Market Reloaded adress (requires TOR Browser):

http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/





Silk Road's main competitor shuts down indefinitely

illegal drugs shutterstock
Black Market Reloaded, the digital black market that was the largest competitor to the recently-busted Silk Road, just announced it's closing and refunding users' money. In order to deal with the influx of Silk Road refugees, Black Market Reloaded spun up some virtual private servers (VPS) hosted by a third party. According to a Black Market Reloaded administrator, one of the VPS administrators leaked the site code — a huge security breach that could compromise the owner's identity.
"This means I can't operate anymore," admin backopy wrote to users. As for when Black Market Reloaded might relaunch, he answered "early 2014 at best. I said one month, give or take, but it looks like I'll take about 1 month to do a clean close at the current site, after sorting disputes and all that that's left." Attempting to visit Black Market Reloaded now redirects to a forum.
Black Market Reloaded now redirects to a forum
Black Market Reloaded was known as the more hardcore version of Silk Road, selling guns in addition to illegal drugs. It was growing fast even before the FBI seized Silk Road. But it seems the golden age of illicit marketplaces, the class of outlaw stores protected by the anonymizing network Tor, may be coming to an end. Black Market Reloaded is actually the third high-profile marketplace to fall in less than two months: Atlantis Market closed before Silk Road.
It's all on you now, Sheep Marketplace.

How to enter "Sheep Market" ??
1. Download & Start TOR 

2. Go to the this adress: http://sheep5u64fi457aw.onion/

3. Create a new account.Happy shopping !!


Today BMR is back online again.
New adress (requires TOR):
http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/

´BlackMarket Reloaded' Online Drug Bazaar Closes After Code Leak

137165972
Just weeks after the FBI took down Silk Road, the Internet's largest "sprawling black market bazaar," one of its main competitors has also gone down. Though it appears the feds aren't behind it.
BlackMarket Reloaded, which launched in 2011, was permanently taken down Thursday for precautionary reasons after someone stole and leaked the site's source code, according to BMR's owner, who goes by the alias "backopy."
"The [virtual private server] admin had stole the code and leaked it," backopy wrote on the BMR forum. "This means I can't operate anymore."
The person who leaked the code helped backopy build the site, according to the post. Backopy also confirmed that the person who stole the code eventually posted it on IoBM.net, a site that "provides informational services for hidden services."
Much like Silk Road, BMR is only accessible through Tor, a software that allows for anonymous browsing. Users paid for transactions with Bitcoin, a virtual currency that is difficult to trace. In addition to selling drugs, BMR also sold weapons, counterfeit documents and other contraband.
The website BlackMarketReloaded.org captured the following screenshot of BMR before it was taken down.


In the same BMR forum thread where he announced the site's closure, backopy expressed disappointment over the turn of events in response to shocked BMR users.
"I hire hits on nobody, it's just sad that someone is running a VPS to peek its contents to pretend to be a hacker," backopy wrote. By referencing murder-for-hire, backopy is apparently trying to make a distinction between himself and Ross Ulbricht, the man the FBI arrested and accused of running Silk Road under the alias "Dread Pirate Roberts." Ulbricht is also accused of offering to pay for murder on two separate occasions, one of which the FBI staged.
In its two-and-a-half year run, Silk Road facilitated $1.2 billion in transactions and collected $80 million in commissions, according to court documents. For a sense of scale, Silk Road has more than 110,000 registered users on its forums, which are still active, while BMR has about 18,000.
It's not immediately clear the nature of the threat which caused backopy to close the site. In response to a user who questioned him on this matter, backopy wrote: "Because i don't know how much of it the hacker has and the code had links to the remaining infrastructure. Would be unwise to let it still up."
Backopy promised users they will be able to retrieve their Bitcoin in the coming days and said a new version of BMR could launch within a month, but he or she has not replied to our inquiry. We will update this story as we learn more.

Today BMR is back online again.
New adress (requires TOR):
http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/


-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
How to enter "Sheep Market" ??
1. Download & Start TOR 

2. Go to the this adress: http://sheep5u64fi457aw.onion/

3. Create a new account.Happy shopping !!

Thursday, October 17, 2013

Another Sloppy Security Blunder Takes Down Another Dark Web Drug Emporium







162913476 
It’s been a bad month for people who like to buy illegal drugs online. Just a few weeks after the illicit marketplace Silk Road got shut down by the feds, one of that site’s main Dark Web competitors is closing down as well. The proprietor of Black Market Reloaded—which Bitcoin Magazine has described as a Silk Road for “people with no moral restrictions at all”—announced Thursday that he was shutting the site. The reason: He’d made a sloppy decision that may have compromised his real-world identity—which is pretty much exactly what the FBI says happened to Ross William Ulbricht, the guy who allegedly ran Silk Road.
Here’s what seems to have happened. As you might imagine, Black Market Reloaded was deluged with new users in the wake of the Silk Road seizure, and the site’s owner, “backopy,” apparently had to acquire new servers to keep the site up and running under this increased demand. In a forum post published today under the title “The end of the road,” backopy wrote that he decided to use a virtual private server, or VPS, in order to meet demand. While you can get a VPS up and running faster than a dedicated physical server, the VPS will be less secure, in part because it is not wholly controlled by the site owner. Sure enough, as backopy wrote, the VPS administrator allegedly leaked the Black Market Reloaded source code. From that code, a careful investigator could have theoretically determined backopy’s identity, and possibly more. With the site compromised, backopy apparently decided to shut it down.
As a frequent evaluator of dumbness, I feel confident in my assessment that this was even dumber than the mistakes that allegedly sank Silk Road. Ross William Ulbricht’s alleged slip-ups came in the site’s early days, before Silk Road became a billion-dollar business. They were novice mistakes made by a novice manager. But Black Market Reloaded has been around awhile, and the site’s administrator should have known the risks of using a VPS. In this case, he actively chose to ignore safety in favor of expedience.
Sites like these promise safety in anonymity—that it’s a security feature when nobody really knows who they’re dealing with. But, as we’re learning, “you don’t know who you’re dealing with” can also be a huge negative when you don’t really know whether that person is taking the appropriate security precautions. And I guess you could argue that total security is always an illusion in cases like these—that as a site scales in size and popularity, it becomes harder to manage, and leads to more opportunities for a breach. Creating a digital trail is always fraught, no matter how well that trail is supposedly concealed or encrypted. That, to me, seems more convincing than the idea that these sites could’ve gone on forever if the creators weren’t big dummies.
Anyway, there are still several Dark Web marketplaces out there, and backopy himself has already promised that he will "come back in the future" with a new, safer version of the site. (Hooray?) I’m eager to see whether he and the other remaining proprietors have learned any lessons from Silk Road and Black Market Reloaded, or whether they, too, will fall in the wake of some digital blunder.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today BMR is back online again.
New adress (requires TOR):
http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

How to enter "Sheep Market" ??
1. Download & Start TOR 

2. Go to the this adress: http://sheep5u64fi457aw.onion/

3. Create a new account.Happy shopping !!

Lessons From Silk Road: Competing Online Drug Site Shuts Down After Security Breach


Anonymous online narcotics bazaar, Black Market Reloaded, was shut down on Thursday after code was leaked online.
It seems like nothing is safe on the darkweb.
On Thursday a leader for underground web marketplace, Black Market Reloaded, announced that the site had shut down in light of security leaks. This marks the third anonymous online drug bazaar to close in less than a month, following the ends of Atlantis and the highly publicized Silk Road.
In a thread titled “The end of the road,” BMR’s owner, known as “backopy,” admits that a fellow site administrator had stolen code on the site and leaked it online. The short post (seen below) suggests that backopy had been compromised by an individual who had served as a virtual private server (VPS) administrator in the marketplace’s early days.
“This means I can’t operate anymore,” backopy writes.
Launched around June 2011, BMR served as a director competitor to the infamous Silk Road, which was seized by the FBI earlier this month. While it did not have the same consumer traction as the Silk Road–which authorities estimated did $1.2 billion in sales since its Jan. 2011 launch–BMR offered a wider variety of goods including illegal firearms.
The Dread Pirate Roberts, the Silk Road’s leader who authorities allege to be 29-year-old Ross Ulbricht, addressed BMR and other competitors in an August interview with FORBES saying, “I like having them nipping at my heels. Keeps me motivated.” Ulbricht was arrested on Oct. 1, and is accused of narcotics trafficking, money laundering and placing hits on two individuals associated with Silk Road.
Backopy seems determined not to meet a similar fate. While he/she writes that their “identity wasn’t compromised in any way,” the BMR leader seems also unaware of how much “[code] the hacker has."
"The code had links to the remaining infrastructure," Backopy writes. "Would be unwise to let it still up."
It seems that backopy and other BMR users first became aware of the leaks after they were posted by a German-speaking individual in an internet forum titled "Freie Märkte/Free Markets." An individual under the name "dosadmin" posted code yesterday after a series of sporadic posts in German that note, among other things, "no hidden service is safe."
Following the end of Atlantis--a fellow drug site that shut down in late September because of "security reasons"--and Silk Road, many vendors and buyers had reportedly moved to BMR to sell or obtain narcotics. In one report, an individual identified as a spokesperson for Atlantis noted that the amount of postings on BMR had almost doubled in the two weeks after Silk Road's closure.
For now, backopy seems to be heeding the lessons of Silk Road and ending operations while he/she remains free. In another post on the forum, backopy goes on to reference Ulbricht's on-going case: "I hire hits on nobody, it's just sad that someone is running a VPS to peek its contents to pretend to be a hacker."

Backopy noted that all money in escrow on the site would be returned to its rightful owners and that he/she would have a system in place in "a few days" that would allow site users to recover bitcoins that were used to purchase drugs and other illegal goods. Backopy also mentioned that a new site "BMRv5" was in the works, suggesting that it would take at least a month to create.
"The roadmap is still long," he/she writes.
With reporting from Andy Greenberg in New York.

Online Drug Markets Are Alive and Thriving


Screen Shot 2013-10-03 at 3.27.49 PM
Silk Road is a black-market website on which buyers and sellers of illicit products, mostly drugs, could come together anonymously using software like Tor, which conceals web browsers’ identity. When the FBI announced this week that it had seized the site’s servers and arrested its alleged owner and operator, Ross William Ulbricht, the Internet almost immediately began speculating over the ramifications.
One possible effect of the Silk Road’s demise would be a precipitous drop in the value of the virtual currency Bitcoin, which Silk Road’s users exchanged for illicit wares. Indeed, in the hours after the news of Silk Road’s shuttering, the value of Bitcoin dropped roughly 20%. But others argued that Silk Road’s closure would actually be good for the currency. Since the main use so far for Bitcoins has been buying drugs on Silk Road, the site’s termination would relieve pressure for governments to crack down on the use of Bitcoin.
The problem with this analysis is that the government’s shutdown of Silk Road is unlikely to shut down the online drug trade overall. In fact, during the months leading up to Silk Road’s demise, the competition over the virtual drug market seemed to be heating up. One site dubbed Atlantis even launched a concerted marketing campaign aimed at eating away at Silk Road’s market share, complete with a YouTube video meant to train new users on how to access the site.
(MORETwitter Wants to Raise $1 Billion in IPO)
Perhaps predictably, Atlantis announced just a few weeks ago that it had been forced to shut down for “security reasons outside its control.” There are at least two other more low-key sites—Black Market Reloaded and The Sheep Marketplace—that are alive and well, with sellers purportedly offering everything from marijuana to ecstasy and firearms. Both of these sites must be accessed using anonymizing networks like Tor, but users discuss their experiences on sites like Reddit, which has dedicated “subreddits” for both Black Market Reloaded and The Sheep Marketplace.
Though the FBI was allegedly able to identify Silk Road’s owner and then locate its servers, there’s nothing in its complaint that suggests the agency compromised the basic infrastructure that enables sites like Silk Road to exist. Here’s what Tor had to say about the incident:
“We’ve been watching carefully to try to learn if there are any flaws with Tor that we need to correct. So far, nothing about this case makes us think that there are new ways to compromise Tor (the software or the network). The FBI says that their suspect made mistakes in operational security, and was found through actual detective work.”
Indeed, according to its complaint, the FBI eventually found Ulbricht by scouring the “surface web” for hints of Ulbricht’s identity—as opposed to the deep web, which is not indexed by search engines. Ulbricht slipped up early in the process when he first began to promote Silk Road on a surface-web site forum dedicated to illegal drugs using the handle “Altoid.” Months later, according to the complaint, Ulbricht appeared on another forum under the same handle asking for information about Bitcoin and asking other readers to email him. He then listed his personal email address. These slip ups, among others, eventually allowed the FBI to close in on Ulbricht identity and the location of Silk Road’s servers.
(MOREInstagram Will Usher in Ads)
One of the reasons Ulbricht was eventually caught was that he purchased several fake IDs in order to rent servers to grow Silk Road’s capacity. Ulbricht had these IDs shipped from Canada, and they were discovered during a routine customs inspection.
And yet, despite the billions spent by local, state and federal governments on the drug war, Americans continue to use illegal drugs at a steady rate. While demand for illicit goods continues, there will likely be entrepreneurs—online or off—willing to supply them.

Read more: http://business.time.com/2013/10/04/online-drug-markets-are-alive-and-thriving/#ixzz2hymK7iGM


How to enter "Sheep Market" ??
 
1. Download & Start TOR 

2. Go to the this adress: http://sheep5u64fi457aw.onion/

3. Create a new account.Happy shopping !!

Free Ross Ulbricht



 His support team just got 15btc that's a shame (https://www.rossulbricht.org/)

Ross Ulbricht has retained New York attorney Joshua Dratel to defend him from criminal charges in the Silk Road/Dread Pirate(s) Roberts case.

More info here:   https://www.rossulbricht.org/

Why the FBI Can’t Get Its Hands on Silk Road Kingpin’s $80 Million Hoard


Bitcoin Value Soars And Drops
Sean Gallup / Getty Images
A sticker on the window of a local pub indicates the acceptance of Bitcoins for payment in Berlin on April 11, 2013
The FBI made headlines last week when it announced that it had shut down the illegal online drug bazaar Silk Road and arrested its alleged operator Ross Ulbricht. According to the FBI’s complaint, the arrest led to the seizure of $3.6 million in bitcoins—the virtual currency Silk Road users employed to buy and sell illegal drugs online.
Though the FBI’s seizure was the second most valuable act of bitcoin confiscation ever, the Feds were actually unable to appropriate the vast majority of bitcoins associated with the Silk Road enterprise, Ulbricht’s personal stash. According to Forbesroughly $80 million worth of bitcoins—the personal fortune Ulbricht amassed by running Silk Road—remains untouched by the government
So why can’t the FBI get its hands on the money? The reason has to do with the design of bitcoins themselves. A bitcoin cannot be transferred  from one user to another without the first users “private key,” or password to verify the transaction. Unless Ulbricht hands over his password, the FBI will be unable take possession of the money. But can the government force Ulbricht to hand over a password? Is it conceivable that even if Ulbritch is convicted that the government could end up never seizing his riches?
(MOREMeet Hershey’s New Candy Brand)
According to Susan Brenner a professor of law and technology at the University of Dayton, Ulbricht could be protected by the fifth amendment from having to hand over the key to his  wealth. The 5th amendment protects citizens from being forced to incriminate themselves, and producing a password that enables access to these coins could be construed as an act of self-incrimination. Brennan explains:
“In order to take the 5th Amendment privilege and refuse to produce something, the act of producing it must communicate that (i) it exists (which may seem obvious, but sometimes producing the thing says it exists), (ii) you have it (or have control over it) and (iii) this is the thing you were ordered to produce (authentication . . . i.e., this is my gun, my money, etc.). The Supreme Court has held that the act of producing something is NOT testimonial if the government knows all three things, i.e., if they all are a foregone conclusion.”
In other words, if the government already knows conclusively that the bitcoins are Ulbricht’s, then he will be unable to claim 5th amendment privilege. He must show that handing over the password somehow makes it evident that the bitcoins are his. Brennan continues:
“If I represented Ulbricht, I would argue that while the generic existence of the bitcoins is a foregone conclusion, his “possession” of them is not . . . and that by providing the password would conclusively establish that they belong to him, which would mean that he would, under the act of production as testimony standard, be “testifying” and, since the testimony would incriminate him, he could take the 5th Amendment.”
So what if Ulbricht is denied 5th amendment protection? Can the government ever actually force Ulbricht to give up his stash? Well, no, but Ulbricht can be held in contempt of court and held in jail indefinitely for defying its order. Then again, Ulbricht is accused of operating perhaps the most vast and far-reaching illegal drug operation in history, so he might be headed to jail for a very long time regardless of whether or not he decides to hand over his bitcoins.
Given this reality, and Ulbricht’s disdain for all forms of governmental coercion, it’s possible he refuses to hand over the loot even if he’s denied 5th amendment protection.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013

Black Market Reloaded – Tips To Stay Anonymous

Stay Anonymous
As you all probably know, when visiting any illegal online drug websites such as Black Market Reloaded you need to stay anonymous so you minimize the risk of being traced. If you make it easy to be found you leave yourself open to information theft, fraud and prosecution. There are a number of different techniques and tools you can use to lower the risk of this happening that i think everyone should really consider using in everything that they now do online so you don’t end up being in a situation that you can not get out of. I have listed these techniques on the “Guide” page which you can see by clicking here. It all starts with using a Proxy or even better a VPN for EVERYTHING you do on the internet. If you have any more suggestions to make yourself anonymous then please leave a comment here and i will review and add to my guide if helpful.

BMR adress (requires TOR):  http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/

Silk Road Shut Down! - Welcome Black Market Reloaded



 New Black Market Reloaded adress (requires TOR):   http://r6rcmz6lga4i5vb4.onion/

Click here to visit read about the Silk Road Successor called Black Market Reloaded.
Silk Road anonymous marketplace was shut down on the end of September 2013. The FBI have arrested a man they believe to be the mastermind behind the biggest online illegal drug website that have ever existed and the site has been shut down. The site was apparently only shut down due to the arrest and not because of the system security. It is believed the mastermind known as Dread Pirate Roberts slipped up while posting programming questions on forums not being anonymous. I am not going to name the accused because i believe in “innocent until proven guilty” but you can find names and photos on the net easily. He is being charged with drug charges and possibly murder for hire charges among others.  If you try to visit the silk road you will see this screen.
Silk road closed
While Silk Road has been flourishing there have been a few other sites come up the ranks and now that the market leader is gone there is going to be a big move made by the up and comers. The next biggest player now is Black Market Reloaded which is very similar and you can click here for a complete step by step guide on how to get to Black Market Reloaded and stay anonymous. I would like to highlight the point that it was apparently old fashioned police work and a slip up that brought Silk Road down, if you are doing anything on any of these sites you need to take every precaution possible to avoid detection and not just while you are visiting these underground black markets. Stay anonymous as much as you can while doing anything on the internet so you don’t slip up.

Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace

Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace


“Silk Road anonymous marketplace was shut down on the end of September 2013. The FBI have arrested a man they believe to be the mastermind behind the biggest online illegal drug website that have ever existed and the site has been shut down. The site was apparently only shut down due to the arrest and not because of the system security. It is believed the mastermind known as Dread Pirate Roberts slipped up while posting programming questions on forums not being anonymous. I am not going to name the accused because i believe in “innocent until proven guilty” but you can find names and photos on the net easily. He is being charged with drug charges and possibly murder for hire charges among others.  If you try to visit the silk road you will see this screen.”


Introduction.

“More brazen than anything else by light-years” is how U.S. Senator Charles Schumer characterized Silk Road [5], an online anonymous marketplace. While a bit of a hyperbole, this sentiment is characteristic of a certain nervousness among political leaders when it comes to anonymous networks. The relativelyrecent development of usable interfaces to anonymous networks, such as the “Tor browser bundle,” has indeed made it extremely easy for anybody to browse the Internet anonymously, regardless of their technical background.
In turn, anonymous online markets have emerged, making it quite difficult for law enforcement to identify buyers and sellers. As a result, these anonymous online markets very often specialize in “black market” goods, such as pornography, weapons or narcotics. Silk Road is one such anonymous online market. It is not the only one – others, such as Black Market Reloaded [3], the Armory [1], or the General Store [7] are or have been offering similar services – but it gained fame after an article posted on Gawker [10], which resulted in it being noticed by congressional leaders, who demanded prompt action be taken.
It is also reportedly very large, with estimates mentioned in the Silk Road online forum [6] ranging between 30,000 and 150,000 active customers. The site has a professional, if minimalist, look, and appears to offer a variety of goods (e.g., books, digital goods, digital currency…), but seems to have a clear focus on drugs. Not only do most items listed appear to be controlled substances, but the screenshot also shows the site advertising a sale campaign for April 20 – also known as “Pot day” due to the North American slang for cannabis (four-twenty).
In this paper, we try to provide a scientific characterization of the Silk Road marketplace, by gathering a 2 set of controlled measurements over roughly six months (February 3, 2012 – July 24, 2012), and analyzing them. Specifically, we offer the following contributions. We devise a (simple) collection methodology to obtain publicly available Silk Road market data.
We use the data collected to characterize the items being sold on Silk Road and the seller population. We describe how items sold and seller population have evolved over time. Using (mandatory) buyer feedback reports as a proxy for sales, we characterize sales volumes over our measurement interval. We provide an estimate of the daily dollar amount of sales conducted on Silk Road, and use this estimate to infer the amount collected in commission by Silk Road operators.
While we cannot estimate the number of buyers with the dataset we collect, we show that Silk Road is a relatively significant market, with a few hundred sellers, and monthly total revenue of about USD 1.2 million. We also show that Silk Road appears to be growing over time, albeit not at the exponential rate that is claimed in forums [6].
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We start by describing how Silk Road operates in Section 2. We then explain how we gather our measurements in Section 3. We report on our measurements analysis in Section 4, before turning to economic implications in Section 5. We discuss our findings, reflect on possible intervention policies, and ethical considerations in Section 6, outline related work in Section 7,and conclude in Section 8.

2 Silk Road overview

Silk Road is an online anonymous marketplace that started its operations in February 2011 [6]. Silk Roadis not, itself, a shop. Instead, it provides infrastructure for sellers and buyers to conduct transactions in an online environment. In this respect, Silk Road is more similar to Craigslist, eBay or the Amazon Marketplace than to Amazon.com. The major difference between Silk Road and these other marketplaces is that Silk Road focuses on ensuring, as much as possible, anonymity of both sellers and buyers. In this section, we summarize the major features of Silk Road through a description of the steps involved in a typical transaction: accessing Silk Road, making a purchase, and getting the goods delivered.
Accessing Silk Road. Suppose that Bob (B), a prospective buyer, wants to access the Silk Road marketplace (SR). Bob will first need to install a Tor client on his machine, or use a web proxy to the Tor network (e.g. http://tor2web.org) as Silk Road runs only as a Tor hidden service [11]. That is, instead of having a DNS name mapping to a known IP address, Silk Road uses a URL based on the pseudo-top level domain. onion, that can only be resolved through Tor. At a high level, when Bob’s client attempts to contact the Silk Road server URL (http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion at the time of this writing), Tor nodes set up a rendez-vous point inside the Tor network so that the client and server can communicate with each other while maintaining their IP addresses unknown from observers and from each other.
Once connected to the Silk Road website, Bob will need to create an account. The process is simple and merely involves registering a user name, password, withdrawal PIN, and answering a CAPTCHA. After this registration, Bob is presented with the Silk Road front page (see Figure 1) from where he can access all of Silk Road’s public listings.
Public and stealth listings. Silk Road places relatively few restrictions on the types of goods sellers can offer. From the Silk Road sellers’ guide [5], “Do not list anything who’s (sic) purpose is to harm or defraud, such as stolen items or info, stolen credit cards, counterfeit currency, personal info, assassinations, and weapons of any kind. Do not list anything related to pedophilia.”
Conspicuously absent from the list of prohibited items are prescription drugs and narcotics, as well as adult pornography and fake identification documents (e.g., counterfeit driver’s licenses). Weapons and ammunition used to be allowed until March 4, 2012, when they were transferred to a sister site called The Armory [1], which operated with an infrastructure similar to that of Silk Road. Interestingly, the Armory closed in August 2012 reportedly due to a lack of business [6].
Not all of the Silk Road listings are public. Silk Road supports stealth listings, which are not linked from the rest of Silk Road, and are thus only accessible by buyers who have been given their URL. Stealth listings are frequently used for custom listings directed at specific customers, and established through out-of-band mechanisms (e.g., private messaging between seller and buyer). Sellers may further operate in stealth mode,meaning that their seller page and all the pages of the items they have for sale are not linked from other Silk Road pages.
While Silk Road is open to anybody, stealth mode allows sellers with an established customer base to operate their business as invitation-only. Making a purchase. After having perused the items available for sale on Silk Road, Bob decides to make a purchase from Sarah (S), a seller. While Tor ensures communication anonymity, Silk Road needs to also preserve payment anonymity.
To that effect, Silk Road only supports Bitcoin (BTC, [30]) as a trading currency. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer, distributed payment system that offers its participants to engage in verifiable transactions without the need for a central third-party. Bob thus needs to first procure Bitcoins, which he can do from the many online exchanges such as Mt.Gox [4]. Once Bob has Bitcoins, and decides to purchase the item from Sarah, instead of paying Sarah directly, Bob places the corresponding amount in escrow with Silk Road. Effectively, B pays SR, not S.
The escrow mechanism allows the market operator to accurately compute their commission fees, and to resolve disputes between sellers and buyers. Silk Road mandates all sellers and buyers use the escrow system. Failure to do so is punishable by expulsion from the marketplace [5].
Finalizing. Once the purchase has been made, Sarah must ship it to Bob. Thus, Sarah needs a physical address where to send the item. To preserve anonymity, Silk Road recommends to use delivery addresses that are distinct from the buyer’s residence. For instance, Bob could have the item delivered at Patsy’s house, or to a post-office box. Once Sarah has marked the item as shipped, Bob’s delivery address is erased from all records. Once the item reaches its destination, Bob finalizes the purchase, that is, he tells Silk Road to release the funds held in escrow to Sarah (i.e., SR now pays S), and leaves feedback about Sarah. Finalizing is mandatory: if Bob forgets to do so, Silk Road will automatically finalize pending orders after a set amount of time.
Sellers with more than 35 successful transactions and who have been active for over a month are allowed to ask their buyers to finalize early; that is, to release payment and leave feedback before they actually receive the item. Due to the potential for abuse, Silk Road discourages finalizing early in general, and prohibits it for new sellers.
Finally, Silk Road enhances transaction anonymity by providing “tumbler” services that consist of inserting several dummy, single-use intermediaries between a payer and a payee. That is, instead of having a payment correspond to a simple transaction chain B → SR → S, the payment goes through a longer chainB → I1 → . . . → In → S where (I1, . . . In) are one-time-use intermediaries.

Collection methodology

We next turn to describing how we collected measurements of the Silk Road marketplace. We first briefly explain our crawling mechanism, before outlining some of the challenges we faced with data collection. We then discuss in detail the data that we gathered.

3.1 Crawling mechanism

We registered an account on Silk Road in November 2011, and started with a few test crawls. We immediately noticed that Silk Road relies on authentication cookies that can be reused for up to a week without having to re-authenticate through the login prompt of the website. Provided we can manually refresh the authentication cookie at least once per week, this allows us to bypass the CAPTCHA mechanism and automate our crawls.
We conducted a near-comprehensive crawl of the site on November 29, 2011,1 using HTTrack [34]. Specifically, we crawled all “item,” “user” (i.e., seller) and “category” webpages. The complete crawl completed in about 48 hours and corresponded to approximately 244 MB of data, including 124 MB of images.
Starting on February 3, 2012, and until July 24, 2012, we attempted to perform daily crawls of the website. We noticed that early in 2012, Silk Road had moved to inlining images as base64 tags in each webpage. This considerably slowed down crawls. Using an incremental mode, that is, ignoring pages that had not changed from one crawl to the next, each of these crawls ran, on average, for about 14 hours.
The fastest crawl completed in slightly over 3 hours; the slowest took almost 30 hours, which resulted in the following daily crawl to be canceled. To avoid confusion between the time a crawl started, and the time a specific page was visited, we recorded separate timestamps upon each visit to a given page.

3.2 Challenges

Kanich et al. [15] emphasize the importance of ensuring that the target of a measurement experiment is not aware of the measurement being conducted. Otherwise, the measurement target could modify their behavior, which would taint the measurements. We thus waited for a few days after the November crawl to see if the full crawl had been noticed. Perusing the Silk Road forums [6], we found no mention of the operators noticing us; our account was still valid and no one contacted us to inquire about our browsing activities.
We concluded that we either had not been detected, or that the operators did not view our activities as threatening. We spent some additional effort making our measurements as difficult to detect as possible. Since all Silk Road traffic is anonymized over Tor, there is no risk that our IP address could be blacklisted. However, an identical Tor circuit (on our side) could be repeatedly used if our crawler keeps the same socket open; this in turn could reveal our activities if the Silk Road operators monitor the list of Tor circuits they are running, and realize that a fixed Tor rendez-vous point is constantly being used.
We addressed this potential issue by ensuring that all circuits, including active circuits, are periodically discarded and new circuits are built. To further (slightly) obfuscate our activities, instead of always starting at the same time, we started each crawl at a random time between 10pm and 1am UTC. Despite all of these precautions, we had to discard some of our data. On March 7, 2012 a number of changes were implemented to Silk Road to prevent profiling of the site [6].
Whether this was due to Silk Road operators noticing our crawls or to other activity is unclear. URL structure changed: item and users, instead of being referenced by a linearly increasing numeric identifier, became unique hashes. Fortunately, these hashes initially simply consisted of a substring of the MD5 hash of the numeric identifier, making All dates and times are expressed in Universal Time Coordinates (UTC).
Each item page contains seller, price, and shipping information, as well as buyer feedback on the item. it easy to map them to the original identifiers.2 More problematically, feedback data, which is crucial to estimating the volume of sales became aggregated and feedback timestamps disappeared. That is, instead of having, for an item G sold by S a list of n feedback messages corresponding to n purchases of G along with the associated timestamps, Silk Road switched to presenting a list of 20 feedback messages, undated, across all the items sold by S. In other words, feedback data became completely useless.
Thankfully, due to very strong pushback from buyers who argued that per-item feedback was necessary to have confi- dence in purchases [6], Silk Road operators reverted to timestamped, per-item feedback on March 12, 2012. Nevertheless, we had to discard all feedback data collected between March 7, 2012 and March 12, 2012. Finally, in several instances, Silk Road went down for maintenance, or authentication was unsuccessful (e.g., because we had not refreshed the authentication cookie in time), leading to a few sporadic days of missing data.
The largest gaps are two eight-day gaps between April 10, 2012 and April 17, 2012 due to an accidental suspension of the collection infrastructure; and between July 12, 2012 and July 19,2012, due to an accidental deletion of the authentication cookie.
To read more about this report please go to: http://cryptome.org/2013/10/silk-road-travel.pdf